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피구오염세에 대한 규제이론적 고찰
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피구오염세에대한규제이론적고찰-1.hwp
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91 Kbyte
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피구오염세에대한규제이론적고찰-1.hwp
[Size :
91 Kbyte
]
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자료설명
I. 서론, , II. 분석모형, , III. 전통적인 피구오염세: 사전적인 규제방식, , IV. 사후적인 피구오염세의 제안, , V. 사후적 규제의 평가 및 논의의 확장, , VI. 결론, FileSize : 92K
목차/차례
- I. 서론 II. 분석모형 III. 전통적인 피구오염세: 사전적인 규제방식 IV. 사후적인 피구오염세의 제안 V. 사후적 규제의 평가 및 논의의 확장 VI. 결론
본문/내용
세계적인 자율화와 분권화의 추세속에서 환경분야의 규제개혁에 대한 연구가 최근의 주요관심사로 부각되고 있다. 환경문제를 해결하기 위한 정부역할이 확대되면서 일률적인 기준에 의한 직접규제방식 위주로 환경정책이 운영됨으로써 각종 비효율적인 규제폐해가 심각하게 대두되었기 때문이다. 환경규제의 중압집권화와 분권화간에는 상반관계(trade-offs)가 존재한다. 예를 들어, 집권화의 경우 규제에 대한 규모의 경제, 월경(trans-boundary) 환경문제의 효율적인 관리 등의 이익이 있는 반면, 정보의 비대칭성, 규제시기의 적절성 등에 있어서는 불리하다. Braden and Proost(1997) 참조. 또한, 지역별로도 환경용량과 환경오염의 특성 등이 다르기 때문에 이에 대처하는 규제방안도 차이가 있어야 한다. 예로 손용엽․이상호(1999)는 광주지역의 환경기준 설정에 대한 경제학적 분석을 고찰하고 있다.
규제자체가 발생시키는 폐해 즉, 정부실패를 치유하기 위해서는 규제개혁을 통해 효율적인 자원배분이 이루어지도록 거래비용을 줄이고, 경제주체들이 스스로 자원을 분배하고 관리하는 유인체계를 진작시켜야 할 것이다.
환경문제의 규제개혁에 대…
참고문헌
참고문헌
김일중, 1994, “효율적인 규제방식으로의 전환을 위한 경제이론,” 규제완화, 제3권(4), 4-52.
김일태, 이상호, 2000, “조세왜곡과 오염배출기업의 최적조세에 관한 고찰,” 자원환경경제연구, 제 9권(4), 701-725.
김재철, 이상호, 1994, “과점시장의 환경오염규제를 위한 최적유인제도에 관한 연구,” 경제학연구, 제41집(3), 27-49.
손용엽, 이상호, 1999, "지역환경문제에 대한 경제학적 접근: 지역환경기준의 설정과 영산강 사례," 광주시 시정연구, 제 20호, 171-207,
Ahn, B. H. and Y. K Kim, 1997, "Tradable Tagged Permit System for Global Pollution Control," Working paper, Korea Advance Institute of Science and Technology.
Baron, D. P, 1991, "Information, Incentive, and Commitment in Regulatory Mechanisms," in Price Caps and Incentive Regulation in Telecommunications (ed. M.A.Einhorn) Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Baron, D. P. and R. B. Myerson, 1982, "Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs," Econometrica 50, 911-930.
Braden, J. B. and S. Proost, 1997, The Economic Theory of Environmental Policy in a Federal System, Edward Elgar.
Conrad, K., 1987, "An Incentive Scheme for Optimal Pricing and Environmental Protection," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 143, 402-421.
Dasgupta, P., P. Hammond and E. Maskin, 1980, "On Imperfect Information and Optimal Pollution Control," Review of Economic Studies 47, 857-860.
Dnes, A. W., 1981, "The Case of Monopoly and Pollution," The Journal of Industrial Economics 30, 213-216.
Kim, J. C. and K. B. Chang, 1993, "An Optimal Tax/Subsidy for Output and Pollution Control under Asymmetric Information in Oligopoly Markets," Journal of Regulatory Economics 5, 183-197.
Kim, J. H. and J. C. Kim, 1995, "Technology Adoption, Incentive Scheme and Credibility," Working paper, Korea Advance Institute of Science and Technology.
Laffont, J. J. and J. Tirole, 1986, "Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms," Journal of Political Economy 94, 614-641.
Laffont, J. J. and J. Tirole, 1990 "The Regulation of Multiproduct Firms," Journal of Public Economics 43, 1-36.
Laffont, J. J. and J. Tirole, 1993, A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation, The MIT Press.
Lee, S. H., 1996, "An Optional Permit System for Global Pollution Control." Economics Letters 50, 79-84.
Lee, S. H., 1999, "Optimal Taxation for Polluting Oligopolists with Endogenous Market Structure," Journal of Regulatory Economics 15, 293-308.
Lee, S. H. and J. C. Kim, 1995, "Oligopolistic Incentives for Pollution Control with Nonzero Conjectures," Economics Letters 49, 95-99.
Lewis, T. R. and D. E. M. Sappington, 1988, "Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Demand," American Economic Review 78, 986-998.
Lewis, T. R. and D. E. M. Sappington, 1989, "Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Demand and Cost Functions," RAND Journal of Economics 19, 438-457.
Loeb, M. and W. A. Magat, 1979, "A Decentralized Method for Utility Regulation," Journal of Law and Economics 22, 399-404.
Roberts, M. J., and M. Spence, 1992, "Effluent Charges and Licenses under Uncertainty," in Environmental Economics: A Reader(ed. Markandya A. and J. Richardson) St. Martins Press.
Sappington, D. E. M. and D. Sibley, 1988, “Regulating without Cost Information: The Incremental Surplus Subsidy Scheme," International Economic Review 29, 297-306.
Shaffer, S., 1989, "A First-Best Regulatory Tax For Oligopoly," Journal of Regulatory Economics 16, 373-389.
Shaffer, S., 1995, "Optimal Linear Taxation of Polluting Oligopolists," Journal of Regulatory Economics 7, 85-100.
Spulber, D. F., 1988, “Optimal Environmental Regulation under Asymmetric Information," Journal of Public Economics 35, 163-181.
Titenberg, T. H., 1992, "Economic Instruments for Environmental Regulation," in Environmental Economics: A Reader (ed. Markandya A. and J. Richardson), St. Martins Press.
Varian, H. R., 1994, "A Solution to the Problem of Externalities when Agents are Well-Informed," American Economic Review 84, 1278-1293.
김일중, 1994, “효율적인 규제방식으로의 전환을 위한 경제이론,” 규제완화, 제3권(4), 4-52.
김일태, 이상호, 2000, “조세왜곡과 오염배출기업의 최적조세에 관한 고찰,” 자원환경경제연구, 제 9권(4), 701-725.
김재철, 이상호, 1994, “과점시장의 환경오염규제를 위한 최적유인제도에 관한 연구,” 경제학연구, 제41집(3), 27-49.
손용엽, 이상호, 1999, "지역환경문제에 대한 경제학적 접근: 지역환경기준의 설정과 영산강 사례," 광주시 시정연구, 제 20호, 171-207,
Ahn, B. H. and Y. K Kim, 1997, "Tradable Tagged Permit System for Global Pollution Control," Working paper, Korea Advance Institute of Science and Technology.
Baron, D. P, 1991, "Information, Incentive, and Commitment in Regulatory Mechanisms," in Price Caps and Incentive Regulation in Telecommunications (ed. M.A.Einhorn) Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Baron, D. P. and R. B. Myerson, 1982, "Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs," Econometrica 50, 911-930.
Braden, J. B. and S. Proost, 1997, The Economic Theory of Environmental Policy in a Federal System, Edward Elgar.
Conrad, K., 1987, "An Incentive Scheme for Optimal Pricing and Environmental Protection," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 143, 402-421.
Dasgupta, P., P. Hammond and E. Maskin, 1980, "On Imperfect Information and Optimal Pollution Control," Review of Economic Studies 47, 857-860.
Dnes, A. W., 1981, "The Case of Monopoly and Pollution," The Journal of Industrial Economics 30, 213-216.
Kim, J. C. and K. B. Chang, 1993, "An Optimal Tax/Subsidy for Output and Pollution Control under Asymmetric Information in Oligopoly Markets," Journal of Regulatory Economics 5, 183-197.
Kim, J. H. and J. C. Kim, 1995, "Technology Adoption, Incentive Scheme and Credibility," Working paper, Korea Advance Institute of Science and Technology.
Laffont, J. J. and J. Tirole, 1986, "Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms," Journal of Political Economy 94, 614-641.
Laffont, J. J. and J. Tirole, 1990 "The Regulation of Multiproduct Firms," Journal of Public Economics 43, 1-36.
Laffont, J. J. and J. Tirole, 1993, A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation, The MIT Press.
Lee, S. H., 1996, "An Optional Permit System for Global Pollution Control." Economics Letters 50, 79-84.
Lee, S. H., 1999, "Optimal Taxation for Polluting Oligopolists with Endogenous Market Structure," Journal of Regulatory Economics 15, 293-308.
Lee, S. H. and J. C. Kim, 1995, "Oligopolistic Incentives for Pollution Control with Nonzero Conjectures," Economics Letters 49, 95-99.
Lewis, T. R. and D. E. M. Sappington, 1988, "Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Demand," American Economic Review 78, 986-998.
Lewis, T. R. and D. E. M. Sappington, 1989, "Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Demand and Cost Functions," RAND Journal of Economics 19, 438-457.
Loeb, M. and W. A. Magat, 1979, "A Decentralized Method for Utility Regulation," Journal of Law and Economics 22, 399-404.
Roberts, M. J., and M. Spence, 1992, "Effluent Charges and Licenses under Uncertainty," in Environmental Economics: A Reader(ed. Markandya A. and J. Richardson) St. Martins Press.
Sappington, D. E. M. and D. Sibley, 1988, “Regulating without Cost Information: The Incremental Surplus Subsidy Scheme," International Economic Review 29, 297-306.
Shaffer, S., 1989, "A First-Best Regulatory Tax For Oligopoly," Journal of Regulatory Economics 16, 373-389.
Shaffer, S., 1995, "Optimal Linear Taxation of Polluting Oligopolists," Journal of Regulatory Economics 7, 85-100.
Spulber, D. F., 1988, “Optimal Environmental Regulation under Asymmetric Information," Journal of Public Economics 35, 163-181.
Titenberg, T. H., 1992, "Economic Instruments for Environmental Regulation," in Environmental Economics: A Reader (ed. Markandya A. and J. Richardson), St. Martins Press.
Varian, H. R., 1994, "A Solution to the Problem of Externalities when Agents are Well-Informed," American Economic Review 84, 1278-1293.
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