미국의 기업 지배구조 : 주주자본주의의 신화와 한계

선우석호 (1999), ꡔM&A: 기업합병·매수와 구조재편ꡕ, 제2판, 법문사.
이병천 (1999), ｢한국의 경제위기와 IMF체제-종속적 신자유주의의 모험｣, ꡔ사회경제평론ꡕ 제13호, pp. 117～165.
전창환 (1999), ｢금융세계화와 세기말 자본주의｣, ꡔ현대자본주의의 미래와 조절이론ꡕ, 문원출판, pp. 93～156.
전창환 (1998), ｢금융세계화와 외환금융위기｣, 이병천·김균 편, ꡔ위기, 그리고 대전환: 새로운 한국경제 패러다임을 찾아서ꡕ, 당대출판사, pp. 301～341.
정건화 (1998), ｢’90년대 미국자본주의의 구조변화와 전망｣, ꡔ입법조사연구ꡕ 통권 254호, pp. 51～86.
조영철 (1999), ｢차입의존경제와 재벌 개혁｣, ꡔ사회경제평론ꡕ 제12호, 한국사회경제학회, pp. 219～250.
조영철 (1998a), ｢국가후퇴와 한국경제발전모델의 전환｣, 이병천·김균 편, ꡔ위기, 그리고 대전환: 새로운 한국경제 패러다임을 찾아서ꡕ, 당대출판사, pp. 137～173.
조영철 (1998b), ｢신제도주의 경제학의 관점에서 본 한국경제성장모형｣, ꡔ입법조사연구ꡕ, 통권251호, pp. 218～261.
조영철 (1997a), ｢기업소유권과 노동자관리기업｣, ꡔ경제학연구ꡕ, 제45집 3호, 한국경제학회, pp. 153～186.
조영철 (1997b), ꡔ스웨덴 복지국가모형의 위기와 변화ꡕ, 국회 입법조사분석실.
조영철 (1996a), ｢규율실업과 노동통제｣, ꡔ사회경제평론ꡕ 제9집, pp. 203～250.
조영철 (1996b), ꡔ재벌문제의 본질 및 재벌정책의 개선방향ꡕ, 국회 입법조사분석실.
조영철·최영섭 (1998), ꡔ산업구조 변화와 인력수급 불균형ꡕ, 한국노동연구원.
조원희 (1999), ｢거래비용경제학의 방법론 및 기본개념에 대한 정치경제학적 비판｣, ꡔ경제학의 역사와 사상ꡕ, 제2호, pp. 240～284.
홍훈 (1999), ｢세계자본주의와 한국의 자본주의: 위기와 미래｣, ꡔ사회비평ꡕ, 제19호, pp. 8～32.
佐藤佑一·永井靖敏 編 (1999), ꡔアメリカ經濟の繁榮は續くかꡕ, 東洋經濟新報社.
靑山和司 (1998), ꡔアメリカの信託と商業銀行ꡕ, 日本經濟評論社.
Aglietta, M. (1998), “Capitalism at the Turn of the Century: Regulation Theory and the Challenge of Social Change”, New Left Review, No. 232, Nov./Dec., pp. 41～90, 전창환 역, ꡔ현대자본주의의 미래와 조절이론ꡕ, 문원출판.
Akhigbe, A and Madura, J. (1996), “Impact of anti-takeover amendments on corporate performance”, Applied Financial Economics, Vol. 6, No. 6, December, pp. 519～530.
Aoki, M. (1998), “An Information Theoretic Approach to Comparative Corporate Governance”, mimeo.
Berle, A. and G. Means (1932), The Modern Corporation and Private Property, Macmillan, New York.
Bhide, A. (1997), “Reversing Corporate Diversification”, in D. H. Chew ed., pp. 106～117.
Binswanger, M. (1999), Stock Markets, Speculative Bubbles and Economic Growth-New Dimensions in the Co-evolution of Real and Financial Markets, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham.
Black, B. (1997), “Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance: The Case for Institutional Voice”, in D. H. Chew ed., pp. 46～56.
Black, S. W. and M. Moersch eds. (1998), Competition and Convergence in Financial Markets-The German and Anglo-American Models, Elsevier Science Publishers, Amsterdam.
Blackburn, R. (1999), “The New Collectivism: Pension Reform, Grey Capitalism and Complex Socialism”, New Left Review, No. 233, January/February, pp. 3～65.
Bowles, S. (1985), “The Production Process in a Competitive Economy: Walrasian, Neo-Hobbesian, and Marxian Models”, American Economic Review, Vol. 75, No. 1.
Brenner, R. (1998), “The Economics of Global Turbulence”, New Left Review, No. 229, May/June.
Cable, J. (1985), “Capital Market Information and Industrial Performance: The Role of West German Banks”, Economic Journal, Vol. 95, pp. 118-32
Champlin, D. P. and J. T. Knoedler (1999), “Restructuring by Design: Government`s Complicity in Corporate Restructuring”, Journal of Economic Issues, Vol. 33, No. 1, March, pp. 41～57.
Chew, D .H. ed. (1997), Studies in International Corporate Finance and Governance System: A Comparison of the U.S., Japan, & Europe, Oxford University Press, New York.
Coase, R. H. (1937), “The Nature of the Firm”, Economica, Vol. 4, No. 4, pp. 386-405.
Corbett, J. and T. Jenkinson (1998), “German investment financing: an international comparison”, in S. W. Black and M. Moersch eds., pp. 102～24.
Crouch, C. and W. Streeck, eds. (1997), Political Economy of Modern Capitalism-Mapping Convergence and Diversity, Sage, London.
Deakin, S. and A. Hughes eds. (1997), Enterprise and Community: New Directions in Corporate Governance, Blackwell, Oxford,
Deakin, S. and G. Slinger (1997), “Hostile Takeover, Corporate Law and the Theory of the Firm”, in S. Deakin and A. Hughes eds., pp. 124～51.
DeAngelo, H. and H. Rice (1983), “Antitakeover charter amendments and stockholder wealth”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 11, pp. 329～60.
Gamble, A. and G. Kelly (1996), “The New Politics of Ownership”, New Left Review, No. 220, November/December.
Ghilarducci, T. (1992), Labor`s Capital-The Economics and Politics of Private Pensions, MIT Press, Cambridge.
Ghilarducci, T., J. Hawley, and A. Williams (1997), “Labour`s Paradoxical Interests and the Evolution of Corporate Governance”, in S. Deakin and A. Hughes eds., pp. 26～43.
Gordon, D. (1996), Fat and Mean, Martin Kessler Books, New York.
Harris, M. and A. Raviv (1991), “The Theory of Capital Structure”, Journal of Finance, Vol. 46, No. 1, March, pp. 297～355.
Harmes, A. (1998), “Institutional investors and the reproduction of neoliberalism”, Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 5, No. 1, Spring, pp. 92～121.
Holle, A. (1998), Corporate Governance by Banks in Transition Economies, Deutscher Universitäts, Verlag, Wiesbaden.
Hopt, K. and E. Wymeersch eds. (1997), Comparative Corporate Governance-Essays and Materials, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin and New York.
Jarrell, G. and Poulsen, A. (1987), “Shark repellents and stock prices: the effect of anti-takeover amendments since 1980”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 19, pp. 127～68.
Jensen, M. (1986), “Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers”, American Economic Review, Vol. 76, No. 2, pp. 323～329.
Jensen, M. (1987), “The Takeover Controversy: Analysis and Evidence”, J. Coffe et al. Takeovers and Contests for Corporate Control, Oxford University Press, in J. Stern and D. H. Chew eds., The Revolution in Corporate Finance, Third Edition, Blackwell, Oxford, 1998, pp. 351～377.
Jensen, M. (1993), “The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control System”, Journal of Finance, Vol. 48, pp. 831～880, in D. H. Chew, ed., pp. 18～37.
Keasey, K., S. Thompson and M. Wright eds. (1997), Corporate Governance: Economic and Financial Issues, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Lazonick, W. (1991), Business organization and the myth of the market economy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Lazonick, W. (1998a), “The Japanese Financial Crisis, Corporate Governance, and Sustainable Prosperity”, Working Paper No. 227, Jerome Levy Economics Institute.
Lazonick, W. (1998b), “Organizational Learning and International Competition”, in J. Michie and J. G. Smith eds., pp. 204～238.
Lazonick, W. and M. O`Sullivan (1997), Investment in Innovation-Corporate Governance and Employment: Is Prosperity Sustainable in the United States? Public Policy Brief, No. 37, Jerome Levy Economics Institute.
Lindberg, L., J. Campbell and J. Hollingsworth (1991), “Economic governance and the analysis of structural change in the American economy”, in L. Campbell , J. Hollingsworth and L. Lindberg eds., Governance of the American Economy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 3～34..
Linn, S. and McConell (1983), “An empirical investigation of the impact of antitakeover amendments on common stock prices”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 11, pp. 361～99.
Marmefelt, T. (1998), “Schumpeterian banker-entrepreneur interaction and the spontaneous evolution of bank-industry networks: why institutional endowments matter”, in K. Nielsen and B. Johnson eds., Institutions and Economic Change-New Perspectives on Markets, Firms and Technology, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, pp. 200211.
Michie, J. and J. G. Smith eds. (1998), Globalization, growth, and governance-Creating an innovative economy, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
O`Sullivan, M. (1998), “Sustainable Prosperity, Corporate Governance, and Innovation in Europe”, in J. Michie and J. G. Smith eds. (1998), pp. 180～203.
O`Sullivan, P. (1997), “Governance by Exit: An Analysis of the Market for Corporate Control”, in K. Keasey, S. Thompson and M. Wright eds., pp. 122～146.
Pollin, R. (1998), “Financial Structures and Egalitarian Economic Policy”, in P. Arestis and M. Sawyer eds. The Political Economy of Economic Policies, Macmillan, Houndmills, pp. 162～201.
Porter, M. (1992), “Capital Choices: Changing the Way America Invests in Industry”, a research report presented the Council on Competitiveness, Washington D. C., in D. H. Chew, ed., pp. 5～17.
Prabalad, C. K. (1993), “Corporate Governance or Corporate Value Added?: Rethinking the Primacy of Shareholder Value”, in D. H. Chew ed., pp. 46～56.
Przeworski, A. (1985), Capitalism and Social Democracy, Cambridge University Press, 최형익 역, ꡔ자본주의와 사회민주주의ꡕ, 백산서당, 1995.
Roe, M. J. (1997), “Path Dependence, Political Options and Governance Systems”, in K. J. Hopt, and E. Wymeersch eds., pp. 165～184
Roe, M. J. (1994), Strong Managers, Weak Owners-The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance, Princeton University Press, Princeton.
Romano, R. (1999), “Corporate Law and Corporate Governance”, in G. R. Carroll and D. J. Teece eds., Firms, Markets and Hierarchies-The Transaction Cost Economics Perspective, Oxford University Press, New York, pp. 365～427.
Shleifer, A. and L. Summers (1990), “The noise trader approach to finance”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 4. No. 2, pp. 19～33.
Shleifer, A. and R. W. Vishny (1997), “A Survey of Corporate Governance”, Journal of Finance, Vol. 52, No. 2, June, pp. 737～783.
Stiglitz, J. E. (1994), Whither Socialism?, MIT Press, Cambridge.
Watson, M. and C. Hay (1998), “In the Dedicated Pursuit of Dedicated Capital: Restoring an Indigenous Investment Ethic to British Capitalism”, New Political Economy, Vol. 3, No. 3, pp. 407～426.
Wenger, E. and C. Kaserer (1998), “The German system of corporate governance-A model which should not be imitated”, in S. W. Black and M. Moersch eds., pp. 41～78.
Wright, M., S. Thompson and K. Robbie (1997), “Venture Capitalists, Buyouts and Corporate Governance”, in K. Keasey, S. Thompson and M. Wright eds., pp. 147～173.
Wright, M. and K. Robbie eds. (1999), Management Buy-outs and Venture Capital-Into the Next Millennium, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham.